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NOTES
JURISDICTION IN SINGLE CONTRACT CASES: Bur-
ger King Sets the Standard. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
The question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant based on contractual dealings with a resident plain-
tiff has long divided the federal and state courts.1 Mindful of
this confusion, the United States Supreme Court in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 2 defined minimum contacts in estab-
lishing jurisdiction and held that a Florida court could exer-
cise jurisdiction over a nonresident purchaser by virtue of his
contract with a Florida corporation obligating him to remit
payments to Miami. The Supreme Court resolved a number
of issues that had previously caused areas of uncertainty in
establishing personal jurisdiction in single contract cases by
concluding that jurisdiction may not be avoided merely be-
cause the defendant did not physically enter the forum,3 and
that an individual's contract with an out-of-state party cannot
alone automatically allow the forum state to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.4
This article will trace the historical development of the
doctrine of personal jurisdiction and then analyze and critique
this Court's rationale and subsequent holding in Burger King.
The Burger King holding will then be assessed as to the effect
of the decision on future single contract litigation.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John Rudzewicz and Brian MacShara, citizens and resi-
dents of Michigan, decided to pursue a Burger King restau-
1. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1508 (1 1th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub
nom. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985). Brian MacShara and
John Rudzewicz were co-defendants in the initial action. Rudzewicz is the only defend-
ant involved in the case which is the subject of this article, as MacShara did not appeal
from the original judgment.
2. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (Stevens, J., joined by White, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 2184.
4. Id. at 2185.
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rant franchise near Detroit, Michigan, in 1978. Rudzewicz, a
senior partner in a Michigan accounting firm, was to put up
the investment capital while MacShara would serve as the
manager. 5
The Burger King Corporation is incorporated in Florida,
with its headquarters in Miami. Burger King also maintains a
network of district offices, one of which is located in Birming-
ham, Michigan. The Miami headquarters sets corporate pol-
icy and works directly with the franchisees when major
problems arise; the district offices monitor the day-to-day op-
erations of the franchisees.6
In the autumn of 1978, Rudzewicz and MacShara jointly
applied for a franchise through Burger King's district office in
Birmingham.7 The Michigan district manager, H.G. Hoff-
man, evaluated the application and wrote to Rudzewicz and
MacShara on behalf of the company to convey approval of the
franchise application. The Michigan office was Burger King's
sole representative in the following months of negotiations
with Rudzewicz and MacShara.8
During the period of negotiations, Hoffman persuaded
Rudzewicz and MacShara to acquire an existing store in
Drayton Plains, Michigan, and convinced them to purchase
$165,000 worth of restaurant equipment. 9 Also, during this
period, MacShara participated in a mandatory training semi-
nar which was conducted at Burger King University in
Miami. o
On May 29, 1979, before the final agreements were signed,
disputes between the franchisees and Burger King arose.
Rudzewicz and MacShara dealt with both Hoffman and the
Miami office in settling the disputes.I After the franchise had
5. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (1985). MaeShara's
managerial experience included previous positions as a supervisor at a construction firm
and an assistant at a Burger King restaurant. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724
F.2d 1505, 1506. (1lth Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Burger King; 105 S. Ct. 2174.
6. 105 S. Ct. at 2178-79.
7. Id. at 2179.
8. 724 F.2d at 1507.
9. Id.
10. 105 S. Ct. at 2179.
11. Id. The parties disagreed over site-development fees, building design, monthly
rent and assignment of liabilities. Id. The rent Burger King expected the franchise to
pay was in excess of Rudzewicz' projections. Rudzewicz demanded a lower figure from
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obtained limited concessions from the Miami office,
Rudzewicz and MacShara signed the lease and franchise
agreements.12 Rudzewicz had obligated himself personally to
payments in excess of one million dollars over a twenty-year
period.13 All rent, royalties, tax refunds and other fees were
to be remitted to the Miami headquarters; in return, Burger
King promised use of its trademark and marketing services.14
The Michigan office was responsible for all supervision, adver-
tising and consultation due under the contract.15
The franchise commenced business in June 1979, and en-
joyed a steady business during the summer; however, pa-
tronage declined later in the year after a recession in Michigan
began. Rudzewicz fell behind in monthly payments and the
Miami headquarters sent notice of default. After payment
rescheduling negotiations among the franchisees, the district
office, and headquarters failed, Burger King terminated the
agreement and ordered the franchisees to vacate the
premises.1
6
Rudzewicz and MacShara refused to vacate, and Burger
King subsequently commenced action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida in May,
198 1, for breach of contract and trademark infringement. The
defendants entered special appearances, arguing that the dis-
trict court lacked personal jurisdiction over them.1 7 After los-
ing on the motion, they filed a counterclaim seeking
Hoffman, but Hoffman replied that the rent computation was out of his hands. 724
F.2d at 1507.
12. 724 F.2d at 1507. Rudzewicz and MacShara signed in their individual capaci-
ties at a Michigan closing ceremony attended by employees of the district office. Id.
13. 105 S. Ct. at 2179.
14. Id. at 2178. The franchise agreement contained a "choice-of-law" provision
which stated:
This Agreement shall become valid when executed and accepted by BKC at
Miami, Florida; it shall be deemed made and entered into in the State of Florida
and shall be governed and construed under and in accordance with the laws of
the State of Florida. The choice of law designation does not require that all suits
concerning this Agreement be filed in Florida.
Id. at 2187.
15. 724 F.2d at 1507.
16. 105 S. Ct. at 2179-80.
17. Id. at 2180. The defendants argued that Burger King's claim did not arise
within the Southern District of Florida; therefore, the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them. Id.
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damages. 18  Judgment was entered for Burger King.19
Rudzewicz then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit,2" where judgment was reversed on the
grounds that the district court could not properly exercise
personal jurisdiction over Rudzewicz pursuant to Florida's
contract long-arm statute.2 Burger King appealed the Elev-
enth Circuit's judgment to the Supreme Court of the United
States.22  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed.23
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINE
In order to properly undertake civil adjudication, a court
must have jurisdiction over both the subject matter24 of the
dispute and the parties involved. When the target of the ac-
tion is a person, the action is classified as "in personam. "25 In
18. Id. Rudzewicz and MacShara sought damages for alleged violations by Burger
King of Michigan's Franchise Investment Law, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1501 et seq.
(1979).
19. 105 S. Ct. at 2180. Burger King was awarded $228,875.40 in contract damages,
as well as costs of $2,151.06 and $30,000 in attorney fees. 724 F.2d at 1508.
20. MacShara did not appeal the judgment. 724 F.2d 1505.
21. 105 S. Ct. at 2180. Under FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (Supp. 1984) jurisdiction
extends to:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who per-
sonally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection
thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from
the doing of any of the following acts:
(g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by
the contract to be performed in this state.
22. 105 S. Ct. at 2181. Burger King appealed the judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(2) (1984). Id.
23. Id. at 2181. It was unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit held that FLA. STAT.
§ 48.193(1)(g) (Supp. 1984) was unconstitutional. Therefore, the Supreme Court held
that there was no jurisdiction by appeal and dismissed that issue. The Court treated the
jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 2103
(1984). Id.
24. Subject matter jurisdiction was not in dispute in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985). Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of the
court to adjudicate the type of controversy before the court. See K. CLERMONT, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 10-17 (1982).
25. The target of the action can be a person or thing. When the interest is a thing,
the action may be classified as in rem or quasi in rem. K. CLERMONT, supra note 24.
The target of the action in Burger King was a person, and thus the action is classified as
in personam. However, the trend is toward eliminating strict categorization of in per-
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this type of action, the due process clause 26 requires that the
court have power over the individual defendant, and that the
exercise of this power be reasonable.27
A. Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction: Physical Presence
The territorial approach to jurisdiction was adopted in
1877 by the United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer v.
Neff,28 where it held that a court lacked personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who was not personally served while physi-
cally present within the forum state.2 9 The Court concluded
that each state could exert power over the persons and prop-
erty within its borders, but was powerless over all persons and
property outside of its borders.30 Thus, the "power principle"
was born.
The power principle, when mechanically applied, proved
useless in civil controversies involving multistate elements. A
number of exceptions were created to add flexibility to the
rule of physical presence. These exceptions included the
"consent" of the defendant to jurisdiction, and the defendant's
"domicile. 3
1
sonam, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 95-189 (1985).
26. "[INor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. K. CLERMONT, supra note 24. For a general background on the area of juris-
dictional doctrine, see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 25. See
also R. BROUSSEAU, CIVIL PROCEDURE 3:1-3:143 (1984).
28. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Neff brought an ejectment action to remove Pennoyer from
land located in Oregon. Pennoyer had bought the land at a sheriff's execution sale; the
land had been sold to enforce a default judgment against Neff. Notice of the commence-
ment of the action against Neff had been published in an Oregon newspaper. However,
Neff was never personally served while present in the state of Oregon. when Neff failed
to appear for trial, a default judgment was entered against him. Id. at 719-20. For an
analysis of early jurisdictional requirements, see Kurkland, The Supreme Court, The
Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958).
29. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.
30. Id. at 722.
31. The biggest exception was that of consent of a defendant, not physically present
in the state, to the jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 724. This consent could also be
implied; therefore, a corporation "doing business" within a state "consented" to juris-
diction there. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882). The exception was later ap-
plied to nonresident tortfeasors. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). Another
exception was that of an individual's domicile. A judgment based on domicile, coupled
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B. Minimum Contacts and the Reasonableness Test
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,32 the United
States Supreme Court expanded the notion of "power" by dis-
pensing with the territorial theory of jurisdiction. Physical
presence was no longer the rule as the Court adopted a new
standard of "minimum contacts, ' 33 and created the "reasona-
bleness test." Under the new test, a defendant must have
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' -3 It is this test which pro-
vided the basis for modem long-arm in personam
jurisdiction.35
with personal service outside the jurisdiction, would be valid. Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932).
32. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This case involved an action by the State of Washington
against a Delaware corporation to collect unpaid contributions to Washington's unem-
ployment compensation fund. Id. at 311. The corporation had no offices in Washing-
ton, but sent salesmen to the state to solicit orders. Id. at 313. These orders were filled
in Missouri, and the goods were then shipped from Missouri to Washington. Id. at 314.
33. Id. at 316. Minimum contacts did not affect the defendant's ability to consent
to suit in a particular forum. This consent may be expressed or implied through a
variety of legal arrangements. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie Des
Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982). See also National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
377 U.S. 311 (1964) (parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the juris-
diction of a particular court); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
(use of forum-selection arrangements is not violative of due process where the provi-
sions are not unreasonable and unjust).
34. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)). "When a controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts
with the forum, a 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' is the
essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colum-
bia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204
(1977)). Where a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising
out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the state, the court is exercising "spe-
cific jurisdiction" over the defendant; a court exercises "general jurisdiction" over a
defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). See also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1144-64 (1966) (the state is exercising
specific jurisdiction over the defendant when the suit arises out of defendant's contacts
with the forum). Where the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the defend-
ant's activities in the forum state, in personam jurisdiction may still be exercised if there
are sufficient contacts between the forum and the defendant. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
414.
35. Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract a
Contact?, 61 B.U.L. REv. 375, 377 (1981).
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The Supreme Court further expanded jurisdiction in Mc-
Gee v. International Life Insurance Co. 36 where it defined min-
imum contacts in terms of quality rather than quantity. A
single act was held to support jurisdiction so long as it created
a "substantial connection" with the forum.37 However, in
Hanson v. Denckla,38 the Supreme Court held that this de-
fendant-forum contact must result from the nonresident's
"purposefully availing" conduct and not the "unilateral activ-
ity" of a third party.39 Thus, a contact was determined to be
sufficient within the purview of International Shoe when the
defendant "purposefully derived benefit" from the activities
within the state,4° "deliberately" engaged in significant activi-
ties within a state, 41 "intentionally" targeted a plaintiff in a
forum state,42 or created "continuing obligations" between
himself and residents of the forum.43 Mere foreseeability of
harm occuring within the forum state was not sufficient to es-
tablish the forum state's jurisdiction.44 The defendant's con-
duct must be such that he should "reasonably anticipate being
haled" into the forum.45
Once the defendant has purposefully established the requi-
site contacts with the forum state, these contacts must be ana-
lyzed to determine whether exercise of jurisdiction in the
36. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction by a California
court over a Texas insurance company whose only contact with California was one
insurance contract. Id. at 224.
37. Id. at 223. California had enacted special legislation to deal specifically with
jurisdiction over nonresident insurance companies. Id. at 221. The Court concluded
that such enabling legislation expressed a strong state interest in regulating these com-
panies, and thus the defendant's single contract with California was a qualitatively high
contact. Id. at 223.
38. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, a Pennsylvania settlor created an inter vivos
trust in Delaware, naming a Delaware company trustee. Id. at 238. The settlor later
moved to Florida, where she executed her power of appointment and received income
from the trust. Id. at 239. Plaintiffs petitioned the Florida court for a declaratory judg-
ment in which the trust company was named as a defendant. Id. at 240-41. The court
held that the trust company did not have sufficient affiliation with Florida to allow the
Florida courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Id. at 253.
39. Id.
40. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1984).
41. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
42. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
43. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950).
44. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
45. Id. at 297.
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specific case would be reasonable.4 6 Other factors to be con-
sidered are the burden on the defendant, the forum state's in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute, the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,
the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of
the several states in furthering fundamental social policies. 47
C. Jurisdiction in Contract Litigation:
The Contract Contact
One type of contract case which has caused great confu-
sion among the courts in the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion is a suit for breach of a contract between the residents of
different states.48 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' deci-
sions in two recent cases illustrate the court's uncertainty in
applying Wisconsin's contract long-arm statute.49
In Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Con-
struction Co.,5° the court of appeals held that where the princi-
pal contact relied upon as a basis for jurisdiction is
performance of contractual obligations in the forum by the
46. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
47. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
48. For a discussion ofjurisdiction in contract litigation, see Brewer, Jurisdiction in
Single Contract Cases, 6 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1983); Note, Long-Arm Jurisdic-
tion in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. REV. 375
(1981).
49. Under Wis. STAT. § 801.05(5)(a) (1984) jurisdiction is extended in cases for:
(5) Local services, goods or contracts. In any action which:
(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd
party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this
state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff.
Id.
In applying any statute, the court must decide whether the specific case fits the
statute facially and whether the statute as applied would violate due process. See
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); In re Liquidation of All-Star Ins., 116 Wis. 2d
72, 327 N.W.2d 648 (1983), appeal dismissed, 461 U.S. 951 (1983).
50. 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980). Lakeside, a
Wisconsin corporation, brought suit against Mountain State, a Virginia corporation, for
breach of contract. Lakeside manufactured materials in Wisconsin to ship to Virginia,
but Mountain State refused to pay. Id. at 598. The contract was the only contact be-
tween Wisconsin and Virginia; all negotiations had been conducted by telephone and
mail. Id. at 597-98. The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on the "purposefully availing"
language of Hanson and concluded that Mountain State had not availed itself of the
benefits and protections of Wisconsin since it had not required the goods to be manufac-
tured there. Id. at 603.
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plaintiff, and not the defendant, this contact is insufficient to
confer jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. 51 Other
factors must be scrutinized in order to determine whether the
defendant "purposefully availed" itself of the benefits of the
forum.52 The court concluded that the defendant's use of in-
terstate telephone and mail service to communicate with the
plaintiff would not establish the minimum contacts. 5
Although the facts in Wisconsin Electrical Manufacturing
Co. v. Pennant Products, Inc. ,4 were similar to those in Lake-
side, the court of appeals found jurisdiction on the basis of two
visits by agents of the defendant to the forum.55 The court
concluded that these acts were significant to the formation of
the contract and in establishing a business relationship. 6
Thus, the defendant "purposefully availed" itself of the bene-
fits of the forum. 57
III. THE BURGER KING OPINIONS
A. The Majority
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court adopted the
Lakeside position that an individual's contract alone will not
constitute a "contact" for purposes of due process.5 8 In deter-
mining whether the defendant purposefully established mini-
mum contacts, the Court provided guidelines by analyzing
"prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,
along with the parties' actual course of dealings and the terms
of the contract."5 9 Physical contact with the forum was not
51. Id. at 601.
52. Id. at 602. This theory of analyzing a defendant's contacts in contract cases is
referred to as "contract plus" jurisdictional analysis. See Note, supra note 35, at 387.
The place where the contract was entered or breached is irrelevant under Wis. STAT.
§ 801.05(5)(a) (1984), but is relevant in some jurisdictions. See, ag., McKee Elec. Co.
v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967).
53. Lakeside, 597 F.2d at 604. The court held that this would "give jurisdiction to
any state into which communications were directed." Id.
54. 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 677.
56. Id. at 677-78.
57. Id.
58. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (1985).
59. Id. at 2186.
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necessary. 60 The Court considered a contract "'but an inter-
mediate step serving to tie-up prior business negotiations with
future consequences which themselves are the real object of
the business transactions.' "61
The Court found that Rudzewicz "deliberately 'reach[ed]
out beyond' Michigan and negotiated with a Florida corpora-
tion for the purchase" of a Burger King franchise and its ac-
companying benefits.62 Rudzewicz' subsequent refusal to
make the required payments for these benefits caused "fore-
seeable injuries to the corporation in Florida. 6 3
After analyzing the parties' course of dealing, the Court
found that Rudzewicz "most certainly knew that he was affili-
ating himself with an enterprise based primarily in Florida." 64
Therefore, he had reason to anticipate a suit outside of Michi-
gan. The Court concluded that the course of dealing repeat-
edly confirmed that decisionmaking authority was vested in
the Miami headquarters, and that the district office was a
"powerless link" between the headquarters and the franchis-
ees. 65 The Court also concluded that there was no disparity of
bargaining power involved in the parties' dealings and result-
ing agreement.66 In analyzing the terms of the contract, the
Court noted the inclusion of a Florida choice-of-law provi-
sion. While the choice-of-law provision alone would not be
60. Id. at 2184. The Seventh Circuit had dispelled with the "footfall theory" in
Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir 1980): "We
are not holding that the 'law's requirement is satisfied by a foot-fall on the state's soil."'
Id. at 678 n.8 (quoting Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir.
1956)).
61. 105 S. Ct. at 2185 (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313,
316 (1943)).
62. 105 S. Ct. at 2186 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643,
647 (1950)).
63. 105 S. Ct. at 2186.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2186-87. It is not clear whether the district office was in actuality a
"powerless link." Compare Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1511 (1 lth
Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. 2174 ("[T]he office in Rudzewicz'
home state conducted all of the negotiations and wholly supervised the contract...")
with 105 S. Ct. at 2179 n.7 (Rudzewicz and MacShara "learned that the district office
had 'very little' decisionmaking authority...
66. 105 S. Ct. at 2188.
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sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the Court found that it pro-
vided Rudzewicz with notice of possible litigation in Florida.67
B. The Dissent
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, concluded that it
was unfair to require Rudzewicz to defend the law suit in
Florida. Rudzewicz did not do business in Florida, and the
food he prepared in Michigan never passed into the State of
Florida. Justice Stevens stated that the principal contacts
throughout the business relationship were with the Michigan
district office.68
Justice Stevens criticized the majority's emphasis on the
terms of the contract. He stated that the boilerplate language
contained in such documents was not enough to establish that
the defendant purposefully availed himself of Florida law.69
IV. CRITIQUE
Burger King was a valiant attempt by the United States
Supreme Court to finally resolve the question of personal ju-
risdiction in single contract cases. The Court started out on
the right track by developing necessary guidelines for estab-
lishing the defendant's contacts with the forum state. The
Court went astray, however, when it mechanically applied
these guidelines to the facts of the case. The result was an
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant that failed to meet
the fairness and reasonableness requirements of International
Shoe.7 °
The Supreme Court found that Rudzewicz had "deliber-
ately reached out beyond Michigan and negotiated with a
Florida corporation."' 7 1 Yet Rudzewicz and MacShara ap-
67. Id. at 2187. The Court found that Rudzewicz established substantial and con-
tinuing contacts with Florida such that Florida had "power" over him by virtue of its
long-arm statute. The exercise of this power was reasonable so as not to violate due
process. Id. at 2190. The Court held that Florida had an interest in resolving the dis-
pute, and found no evidence that it was unreasonable to require Rudzewicz to defend in
Florida. Id. at 2188.
68. Id. at 2190 (Stevens, J., joined by White, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 336 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
71. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (1985) (quoting Travel-
ers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)).
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plied for a franchise through the Michigan district office.
During the course of negotiations the district office was Bur-
ger King's sole representative. As sole representative, it di-
rected the franchisees as to what building and equipment to
purchase.7 2  There was no evidence to indicate that
Rudzewicz ever had contact with anyone in Miami during the
period of negotiations; 73 thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that "[t]o Rudzewicz, the Michigan office was for all intents
and purposes the embodiment of Burger King. He had reason
to believe that his working relationship with Burger King be-
gan and ended in Michigan, not at the distant and anonymous
Florida headquarters. '74
The Supreme Court in United States v. Rumley75 stated
that courts must not be blind to what "[a]ll others can see and
understand. ' 76 Yet the majority in Burger King reached a fi-
nal decision that failed to take into consideration what
Rudzewicz and the court of appeals saw and understood.
Ironically, the Supreme Court in Burger King also cited its
earlier decision in Rumley, but failed to acknowledge this sub-
stantive distinction. 77
The Supreme Court also hastily brushed over the issue of
whether disparity existed between the parties during the
course of dealing and the resulting franchise agreement by
stating that Rudzewicz and MacShara "were and are exper-
ienced and sophisticated businessmen" who at no time had
acted "under economic duress or disadvantage imposed by
Burger King. ' 78 However, the court of appeals discerned that
there was a "characteristic disparity of bargaining power in
the facts of the case."' 79 Rudzewicz was not at liberty to nego-
tiate the terms of the contract; the contract was a standard
form with non-negotiable terms. °
72. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1507 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd
sub nom. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. 2174.
73. Id. at 1511.
74. Id.
75. 345 U.S. 41 (1943).
76. Id. at 44 (quoting The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922)).
77. 105 S. Ct. at 2190.
78. Id. at 2188-89.
79. 724 F.2d at 1512.
80. Id.
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Thus, Rudzewicz was essentially in a take-it-or-leave-it sit-
uation: he either had to accept the boilerplate terms of the
contract or forego the franchise. While this may not necessar-
ily constitute "economic duress," it illustrates the superior
bargaining position of the corporation. Rudzewicz' account-
ing experience and MacShara's "stint""' as a one-time Burger
King employee hardly qualify them as "sophisticated busi-
nessmen." By ignoring the obvious disparity between
Rudzewicz and Burger King, the Supreme Court is setting a
dangerous precedent which the court of appeals notes, "could
ultimately sow the seeds of default judgments against fran-
chisees owing smaller debts. '8 2
The Supreme Court relied heavily on the choice-of-law
clause within the franchise agreement in establishing jurisdic-
tion, despite its disclaimer that "such a provision standing
alone would be insufficent to confer jurisdiction. ' 83  The
Court reasoned that this clause, coupled with a twenty-year
contractual relationship between Rudzewicz and Burger
King, was sufficient to give notice to Rudzewicz of the possi-
bility of litigation in Florida. Moreover, by entering into a
contract containing a choice-of-law provision, Rudzewicz had
"purposefully availed himself to the benefits and protections
of Florida's laws."'8 4
The Supreme Court's emphasis on choice-of-law provi-
sions is disturbing and raises new questions: If a choice-of-law
clause alone is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction, what else
is necessary? Of what significance is the duration of the con-
tract in satisfying sufficiency? The court of appeals avoided
the choice-of-law issue entirely by concluding that it was irrel-
evant to the question of personal jurisdiction. 5
81. Id. at 1507.
82. Id. at 1511.
83. 105 S. Ct. at 2187.
84. Id.
85. 724 F.2d at 1511-12 n.10. The Eleventh Circuit relied on Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958) for the proposition that "the center of gravity for choice-of-law
purposes does not necessarily confer the sovereign prerogative to assert jurisdiction."
724 F.2d at 1511-12 n.10 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254). The Court in Hanson and
in subsequent cases held that choice-of-law analysis was distinct from minimum-contact
jurisdictional analysis. See 105 S. Ct. at 2187. Choice-of-law analysis focuses on all the
elements of a transaction, whereas minimum-contacts analysis focuses on the defend-
ant's conduct with the forum. The Court in Burger King concluded that there were no
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Justice Stevens stated in the dissent that he found the opin-
ion of the Eleventh Circuit more persuasive than that of the
majority. He criticized the majority's reliance on the terms of
the contract in establishing jurisdiction,8 6 concluding that
"such superficial analysis creates a potential for unfairness not
only in negotiations between franchisors and their franchisees
but, more significantly, in the resolution of the disputes that
inevitably arise from time to time in such relationships."87
The Eleventh Circuit aptly summarized the issue of unfairness
when it stated:
In sum, we hold that the circumstances of the Drayton
Plains franchise and the negotiations which led to it left
Rudzewicz bereft of reasonable notice and financially unpre-
pared for the prospect of franchise litigation in Florida. Ju-
risdiction under these circumstances would offend the
fundamental fairness which is the touchstone of due
process.88
V. CONCLUSION
Burger King v. Rudzewicz is no doubt a landmark decision
in the area of contract litigation. The Supreme Court tied to-
gether the various theories on jurisdiction and established
comprehensive guidelines for determining in personam juris-
diction in single contract cases. The Court also resolved the
issues of physical contacts and sufficiency of single contract
contacts that had left the courts in a state of confusion.
Burger King, however, raises a number of new uncertain-
ties that will plague the courts as they grapple with determin-
ing just how much deference to accord contract provisions.
While Burger King proposes to offer a solution to jurisdiction
in single contract cases, this solution may prove to be no more
than a trap for the inexperienced and unwary.
CHRISTIE A. LINSKENS
cases indicating that a choice-of-law provision could not be considered in minimum-
contact analysis. Id.
86. 105 S. Ct. at 2190.
87. Id. Although Burger King dealt with a franchise agreement, the opinion is not
meant to be limited to this specific area of contracts.
88. 724 F.2d at 1513.
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